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REHABILITATING THE IMPEACHED WITNESS
WITH CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
ELWOOD L. THOMAS*
In the recent case of Stafford v. Lyon' a witness testified on direct
examination that the cause of a four-car chain type collision was the
third car hitting the second car and forcing it forward into the first car.
On cross-examination the witness was impeached with his written state-
ment that he was not certain of the sequence of the collisions. He ad-
mitted making this statement. On re-direct examination an earlier written
statement was admitted wherein he described the sequence of collisions as
he had on direct examination. On appeal the Missouri court was con-
fronted with the problem that is the subject of this article: under what
circumstances may the witness' out-of-court statements which are consistent
with his in-court testimony be used for rehabilitation? In a majority of jur-
isdictions the consistent statement in Stafford would be excluded; 2 the Mis-
souri court followed its prior decisions and approved the admission of the
statement.3
I. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
A. For Purposes Other Than Rehabilitation
Consideration of the use of consistent statements to rehabilitate must
begin with an examination of the admissibility of consistent statements in
general. The widely accepted rule is that, apart from rehabilitation, out-of-
court statements consistent with the witness' in-court testimony are not
admissible.4 In the very early case of Riney v. Vanlandingham,5 the de-
fendant called witnesses to relate occasions on which they had heard the
defendant tell the same story as he told on the witness stand. The Missouri
Supreme Court adopted the general rule rejecting the evidence.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. 413 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. 1967).
2. Annot., 140 A.L.R. 21, 49 (1942); 75 A.L.R.2d 909, 930 (1961); Mc-
CoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 49 (1954).
3. Stafford v. Lyon, 413 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Mo. 1967).
4. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1124 (3rd ed. 1940).
5. 9 Mo. 816' (1846).
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On several occasions, the court has reaffirmed the rule.6 They have re-
jected testimony of the particular facts of a rape as related by the victim
after the crime occurred 7 even when the prosecutrix was a child of weak
mind whose testimony on direct was poor." They have refused to allow
the testimony of a railroad employee to be corroborated by his oral or
written report to his employer containing the same facts as his testimony.9
They have reversed the trial court where a witness was allowed to state
on re-direct examination that before trial he told his attorney the same
facts as he testified to on direct examination.10 In these cases the court has
reasoned:
To permit a party to corroborate a witness by proof that on some
other occasion the witness made the same statements to another
party which he or she has testified to upon the trial would set up
a new and dangerous method of corroboration. . . . If such a
practice . . . were permitted, an untruthful witness could then cor-
roborate himself as to a falsehood by first relating the falsehood to
other parties, and then, after he has sworn to the falsehood, intro-
duce such other parties to show that he has theretofore made the
same statements to them."
These cases exemplify the well accepted general rule: in the absence
of some special function, the out-of-court consistent statement of the wit-
nss will not be admitted in evidence.
B. For Rehabilitation
1. In General
When consistent statements are admitted, it is generally for the pur-
pose of rehabilitating an impeached witness. They can not be used to
rehabilitate all impeached witnesses, however, but are admitted only in
certain situations. In analyzing and classifying these situations, some courts
have failed to recognize that they are essentially dealing with a question
of relevancy.
6. State v. Johnson, 334 Mo. 10, 64 S.'W.2d 655 (1933); Quinn v. Berberich,
68 S.W.2d 925 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934); State v. Emma, 324 Mo. 1216, 26 S.W.2d
781 (1930) (dictum); see Ayres v. Keith, 355 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Mo. 1962).
7. State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405 (1909); State v. Bateman,
198 Mo. 212, 94 S.W. 843 (1906); State v. Jones, 61 Mo. 232 (1875). Contra,
State v. Richardson, 349 Mo. 1103, 163 S.W.2d 956 (1942).
8. State v. Burgess, 259 Mo. 383, 394-96, 168 S.W. 740, 742-43 (1914).
9. Aly v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. L., 336 Mo. 340, 78 S.W.2d 851 (1934);
Radler v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 330 Mo. 968, 51 S.W.2d 1011 (1932).
10. ,State v. Brown, 247 Mo. 715, 153 S.W. 1027 (1913).
11. State v. Burgess, 259 Mo. 383, 395, 168 S.W. 740, 742 (1914).
1967]
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss4/4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
To frame correctly the relevancy issue, there are two important con-
siderations. The first is a recognition of the scope of the rehabilitating evi-
dence. Consistent statements are not admitted as substantive proof of
the facts stated since to do so would violate the hearsay rule.12 They are
admitted only for the purpose of showing the act of naking the consistent
statement. The scope of the rehabilitating evidence is the fact of assertion,
not the facts asserted.' 3 The second consideration is to determine correctly
the issue which the evidence is offered to prove. In the rehabilitation situa-
tion, that issue is determined by the nature of the impeaching evidence. It
is essential to consider carefully the type of impeachment and to determine
how that particular evidence serves to discredit the witness. The admission
or exclusion of the consistent statement should depend on whether it effec-
tively meets the impeaching fact.
In general, the question is one of relevancy: in particular, it is whether
the act of making a consistent statement is relevant to refute the impeach-
ing fact. Because of the importance of carefully applying this reasoning to
the problem, it is misleading merely to classify the cases as generally in-
volving rehabilitation. They are better categorized and considered accord-
ing to the nature of the impeachment. The discussion which follows is
organized on that basis.
2. Rehabilitation After Impeachment Charging Bias
The courts in most states admit certain consistent statements for the
rehabilitation of a witness impeached by a showing of bias, interest, or
corruption. 14 Bias can be based either on the claim that the witness is
particularly friendly to one party or that he is hostile to the other. For
example the former might be shown by evidence of a family or business
relationship between the witness and the party calling him, the latter
by showing that the witness and the opposing party had a fight or that
a law suit is pending between them. Impeachment by showing interest
involves evidence that the witness is financially interested in the outcome
of the litigation such as where he will share in the proceeds. The classic
12. Stratton v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 337 S.W.2d 927, 930-32 (Mo. 1960);
State v. Emma, 324 Mo. 1216, 1224-25, 26 S.W.2d 781, 785 (1930); Gough v. Gen-
eral Box Co., 302 S.W.2d 884, 888 (Mo. 1957) (dictum); Hammond v. Schuermann
Bldg. & Realty Co., 352 Mo. 418, 177 S.W.2d 618 (1944) (dictum); State v. Creed,
299 Mo. 307, 314-17, 252 S.W. 678, 680 (1923) (dictum).
13. Hammond v. Schuermann Bldg. & Realty Co., supra note 12, at 423, 177
S.W.2d at 622.
14. Annot., 140 A.L.R. 21, 80 (1942); 75 A.L.R.2d 909, 937 (1961); WIcMOaE,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 1128.
[Vol. 32
3
Thomas: Thomas: Rehanilitating the Impeached
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
REHABILITATING WITNESSES
example of impeachment by showing corruption is where the witness is
bribed. These are only a few examples of the infinitely varied circumstances
giving rise to this method of impeachment. For brevity, all these will be
referred to as bias cases.
The impeaching evidence in these cases tends to show the existence
of facts or circumstances which are claimed to have improperly influenced
the testimony of the witness. How is evidence of a consistent statement by
the witness relevant to refute this impreachment? If the witness made
the consistent statement at a time before the discrediting influence existed this
indicates that the impeaching circumstance actually had no effect on the testi-
mony. The evidence is focused on cause-it suggests that the bias did not
cause false testimony since the testimony has not changed. The statement is
usually not offered to refute the existence of the impeaching facts: it is
offered to refute the claim that those facts had any effect on the testimony.
It is the timing of the statement which makes it relevant, and only those
statements made prior to the time of the claimed bias are admissible. This
is the rationale for the use of consistent statements in these cases.
Two Missouri cases clearly demonstrate this theory. In Kelly v. Ameri-
can Cent. Ins. Co.,'5 an action on a fire insurance policy, the company's
witness testified that he was hired by the plaintiff to set the fire. On cross-
examination the plaintiff impeached with evidence suggesting that the
witness was being paid by the insurance company to testify falsely. To
rehabilitate, evidence was admitted showing that the witness made state-
ments confirming the truth of the arson charge three days prior to the
fire. Since at that time the insurance company had no interest in either
the witness or the fire, the consistent statements were effective to refute
the bribery charge. The court stated:
The exception [admitting the consistent statement] . . . proceeds
of sound reason and in accord with the principles of natural justice,
for, on the suggestion of a corrupt motive for such testimony com-
ing in, it enables the party to rehabilitate the witness by showing
that he had made the same statement at a time prior to any occa-
sion for the corruption of the witness, and thus tends to remove
the shadow so cast.16
In State v. Stogsdil-17 the prosecution claimed that the defendant and three
15. 192 Mo. App. 20, 23-26, 178 S.W. 282, 283 (St. L. Ct. App. 1915).
16. Id. at 25, 178 S.W. at 283.
17. 324 Mo. 105, 126, 23 S.W.2d 22, 29-30 (1929). The witness was also
impeached by showing his prior inconsistent testimony at an inquest where he
testified he knew nothing about the killing, but the admission of the consistent
statement is clearly under the bias rule.
1967]
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fellow railroad employees killed another employee who had seniority rights
over them. The witness, one of the wrongdoers, testified that the defendant
had committed the killing. On cross-examination there was evidence that
the witness had been promised leniency in his own case as a reward for
his testimony against the defendant. The state was then allowed to show
that before the offers of leniency were made, and therefore at a time
before these improper influences could have operated upon the witness,
he made statements that the defendant committed the killing. Again the
Missouri court approved rehabilitation with consistent statements in bias
cases, and they have recognized this rule on several other occasions.' 8
Since the whole theory of admission is based on the premise that the
statement predates the existence of the discrediting influence, proof of the
time when the statement was made is crucial. In a hit and run case,19
where the impeachment was again based on offers of leniency by the
prosecuting attorney, the court held that the party who offers the con-
sistent statement has the burden of proving the requisite time relationship
between the improper influence and the making of the statement. The
court approved exclusion of the rehabilitating statement because the state
failed to develop facts as to the time sequence.
The rationale is sound, the rule is clear, and most courts including
Missouri have had little difficulty in using prior consistent statements to
refute impeachment based on bias.
3. Rehabilitation After Impeachment Charging "Recent Fabrication"
Another type of impeachment where consistent statements are relevant
for rehabilitation is called "recent fabrication"2 0 or "recent contrivance."
21
In general, these cases involve impeachment by a charge that the testi-
mony of the witness is a fabrication of recent date, or complaint only
recently made. The common characteristic in these cases is the implication
that the testimony of the witness is not the story told by him from the
beginning, but is one concocted for the purpose of the trial.
18. State v. Brown, 247 Mo. 715, 725-27, 153 S.W. 1027, 1030 (1913) (dictum);
State v. Taylor, 134 Mo. 109, 154-56, 35 S.W. 92, 103 (1896) (dictum); Riney v.
Vanlandingham, 9 Mo. 816, 821-22 (1846) (dictum); Williams v. St. Louis Pub.
Serv. Co., 245 S.W.2d 659, 665 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952) (dictum) rev'd on other
groutnds 363 Mo. 625, 636, 253 S.W.2d 97, 103-04 (En Banc 1952). See State v.
Creed, 299 Mo. 307, 252 S.W. 678 (1923).
19. State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 324-25, 296 S.W. 132, 134 (1927).
20. Annot., 140 A.L.R. 21, 93 (1942); 75 A.L.R.2d 909, 939 (1961); 58 AM.
Jua. Witnesses § 828 (1948).
21. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1129 (3rd ed. 1940).
[Vol. 32
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The courts have used this "recent fabrication" label in cases involving
two distinctly different theories of impeachment: those where the fact of false
testimony must be inferred from evidence of motive for fabrication, and
those where there is evidence indicating the testimony is false but no
showing of motive. The latter type of cases are often called the silence cases
because impeachment is based on evidence that the witness did not speak
of a fact at a time when it would have been natural to speak of it. The
inference that the testimony is a recent fabrication is drawn from the fact
that on a prior occasion when the witness told his story, he did not include
some fact which he now includes. The addition of this fact is claimed to be
the recent fabrication. The distinguishing feature of this impeachment is
that it is not based on a showing of motive for fabrication; the false na-
ture of the testimony is to be inferred solely from a comparison of the
present testimony with the prior story.
This impeachment can be refuted in two ways with consistent state-
ments. First, it may be shown that the witness was not silent as alleged
but in fact made the statements claimed to have been omitted. Because of
the nature of the impeachment these statements will be consistent with
the testimony of the witness. The relevance of the statements
in this situation is obvious: they directly contradict the charge of silence.
Second, the impeachment may be refuted by showing consistent state-
ments made at a time near the alleged silence although not on that par-
ticular occasion. Here, the evidence does not directly contradict the charge
of silence. It is relevant, however, because it tends to explain the ambiguous
nature of the silence. The rationale of the impeachment is to infer from
the silence that the testimony was recently fabricated for purposes of this
litigation. But other inferences could just as easily be drawn; the silence
may indicate mere forgetfulness or oversight. Evidence that the witness
included the missing fact when he told the story on another occasion at or
near the time of the silence is relevant because it suggests forgetfulness or
oversight instead of subsequent fabrication. This tends to remove the dis-
crediting inference created by the silence.
In either situation, the relevance of the consistent statement is clear,
and courts have generally admitted the statements in the silence cases.
22
In one Missouri case23 that involved this type of impeachment the court
held that the consistent statement was not admissible because it was not
prior in time to the alleged silence. Furthermore the court stated that this
22. Ibid.
23. State v. Ashbrook, 11 S.W.2d 1037, 1040 (Mo. 1928).
1967]
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type of impeachment will not authorize rehabilitation under the rules
applied when the witness is impeached with inconsistent statements.2 4 This,
of course, is true, but the court stopped far short of the correct considera-
tion of the problem since they failed to recognize or discuss the completely
different rationale for admitting consistent statements in the silence cases.
Despite this failure to apply the appropriate theory, the silence rule
was clearly approved by the St. Louis Court of Appeals by the following
language in Williams v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.:25
Another instance where such evidence [a consistent statement] is
admitted is where the witness is discredited by showing that the
facts testified to have been concealed under conditions which war-
rant the belief that, if true, the witness would have stated them.26
Another Missouri case27 involving impeaching evidence of the silence
type, combines the rationale of both the silence cases and the bias cases
in a unique and well-reasoned decision. The plaintiff, an orphan boy,
claimed that the defendant, with whom he lived for four years, severely
beat him on four occasions. The boy was impeached by witnesses who testi-
fied that during several conversations with him while he was living with
the defendant, he made no complaints of his treatment. This would be a
typical silence case if the plaintiff could have then offered evidence show-
ing complaints made while he lived with the defendant, but this could not
be shown. However, plaintiff did offer evidence that he made complaints
after he left the home of the defendant but before trial. The court reasoned
that in the bias cases consistent statements are admitted if made at a time
when motive for false testimony is not present. Although this is normally
before the existence of the discrediting influence, the significant factor is
the absence of the motive at the time of the statement. Here the boy did
not speak while in the home of the defendant because of duress and fear.
When these influences were removed by his moving from the home, his
complaints were immediately voiced. By combining the reasoning of the
bias cases (a consistent statement made in the absence of motive to falsify)
with that of the silence cases (refuting the discrediting inference to be
24. State v. Ashbrook, supra note 23. But see State v. Sharp, 183 Mo. 715,
735, 82 S.W. 134, 141 (1904) where the facts fit the silence-recent fabrication rule,
but the court applies the inconsistent statement rule.
25. 245 S.W.2d 659, 663-66 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952) (dictum) rev'd on other
grounds 363 Mo. 625, 253 S.W.2d 97 (En Banc 1952).
26. Id. at 665.
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drawn from the failure to speak) the court approved the admission of this
evidence. The case is unique, not only because it combines the two theories,
but also because it applies the bias reasoning to admit a consistent state-
ment made after the termination of the motive to falsify rather than before
that motive existed.
Wigmore would limit "recent fabrication" to the silence cases. 28 How-
ever, many courts and writers recognize a second category.29 These are
as noted, cases where the fact of false testimony is inferred from evidence
showing a motive for fabrication. A Missouri decision demonstrates the
applicable situation. In State v. Richardso a° the defendant was charged
with the statutory rape of his fourteen year old daughter. After the girl
first accused her father, she retracted her story saying it was made up to
get even with him for whipping her. However, under the alleged influence of
her mother and a friend, she later disavowed the retraction and accused her
father in testimony for the prosecution. On cross-examination the retraction
and the influence of the mother and the friend were shown. The mother
was then allowed to testify that her daughter told her of the father's attack
shortly after the incident. In admitting this evidence of the daughter's con-
sistent statements the court stated:
. . . the mother's testimony concerning the prosecutrix' original
complaint-consistent with her testimony at the trial-was admissi-
ble (even in detail) to rehabilitate the prosecutrix ... and to sus-
tain her against the charge of "recent contrivance -that is, of
fabricating the trial charge against her father, with the aid of her
mother and Mrs. Black [the friend].3 1
These cases classified under "recent fabrication" but based on a showing
of motive are actually bias cases. The motive shown invariably consists of
some type of bias, interest, or corruption. The consistent statements made
before the existence of the motive are relevant for the same reasons as
in the bias cases; they refute the inference that the motive had any effect
on the testimony. Much unnecessary confusion in the cases is caused by
the court's insistence on two categories for these cases without any meaning-
ful basis upon which to distinguish one from the other. Thus on one occasion
a case charging recent fabrication shown by bias will be discussed in terms
28. 4 WIGMORE, Op. cit. supr,a note 21.
29. Annot., 140 A.L.R. 21, 93 (1942); 75 A.L.R.2d 909, 939 (1961); 58 AM.
JUR. Witnesses § 828 (1948).
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of recent fabrication, while on another occasion the same court will discuss
a similar factual situation under the bias rules. 32
The only possible distinguishing feature between the regular bias cases
and those considered under the concept of recent fabrication is the require-
ment that the fabrication be recent. This may or may not be present in the
cases considered under the bias rules. At best, this only adds another
argument for the relevancy of the consistent statement. This would be
based on the contention that the prior statement consistent with the testi-
mony shows that the content of the testimony is of long standing, and
therefore its origin is not recent as charged. Since the portion of the im-
peaching charge relating to recent timing is thus shown to be untrue, the
contention is that the whole impeaching charge is weakened. This argument
is weak and is only supplemental. The bias rationale is primary in these
cases and is sufficient in itself for admission. Although the results will
generally be the same under either rule, the concepts become very con-
fusing when a distinction of such little significance is so haphazardly applied.
Difficulty of a more serious nature is encountered if a court takes the
label "recent fabrication" literally and applies the rule to admit consistent
statements after all forms of impeachment where an inference of recent
fabrication can be drawn. This is particularly true if they are careless in
applying the requirement that the fabrication be recent. Any fabrication is
recent in a sense when it is compared with a consistent statement which is
prior. The concept was never intended to be applied so liberally, but should
be limited to situations where, in substance, the impeachment charges the
witness with altering or concocting his testimony solely for the purpose
of this litigation.
Once the requirement of recent timing is relaxed and the recent fabrica-
tion rule is broadened to include any type of impeachment, the door is open
for the admission of consistent statements for rehabilitation in almost any
case. The misuse of the rule is particularly troublesome when the impeach-
ment is by inconsistent statements~3 In these situations it is easy to con-
tend that an inconsistent statement infers fabrication which is more recent
than a prior consistent statement; therefore, it is a recent fabrication; there-
fore, this consistent statement should be admitted. The difficulty is that,
32. Compare State v. Richardson, supra note 30 wit&- Kelly v. 'American
Centr. Ins. Co., supra note 15 and State v. Stogsdill, supra note 17.
33. State v. Higgs, 259 S.W. 454, 457 (Mo. 1924) inconsistent statement case
discussed in terms of recent fabrication; see Jones v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 253 S.W.
737, 740-41 (Mo. 1923).
[Vol. 32
9
Thomas: Thomas: Rehanilitating the Impeached
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
REHABILITATING WITNESSES
with this broad application, the original theory of relevancy is no longer
applicable. This is one of the reasons for the large number of questionable
decisions in the inconsistent statement cases.
Wigmore's position of treating the recent fabrication cases where mo-
tive is shown in the same category with the bias cases is probably the best
solution.34 At least it must be recognized that there is really no basis for
distinction between these types of cases. The issue is relevancy, and both
types of cases proceed on the same theory of relevancy: the consistent state-
ment made prior to motive for fabrication, whether it be recent or otherwise,
refutes the inference that the motive had any discrediting effect on the
testimony. Any extension of the rule to situations where this reasoning is
inapplicable only leads to confusion.
In Nielsen v. Dierking,35 a 1967 decision, the Missouri Supreme Court
correctly avoided extending the bias and recent fabrication rules beyond
their proper scope. However, some language in the opinion, if not clarified,
could lead to the unfortunate result of totally rejecting these rules in all
cases. The primary issue in the case was the admission of a written consistent
statement for rehabilitation under the Missouri rule admitting such state-
ments following impeachment by inconsistent statement.3 6 Because of the
timing of the consistent statement, it was not admissible under our incon-
sistent statement rule.37 As an alternative ground for admission, the de-
fendant claimed that the over-all cross-examination of the witness tended
to impute improper motives to her or to show influences on her to fabricate
her testimony at the trial causing the consistent statement to be admissible
under either the bias rule or the recent fabrication rule.
The exact nature of the cross-examination is not disclosed in the opinion,
but it appears that the impeachment was not of the type necessary to
bring either of these rules into operation, and the opinion ultimately reaches
this conclusion.38 However, in reaching what is clearly the correct decision,
the following language could lead to difficulty in the future:
More recent cases in Missouri have made no reference to the
question of charges of recent fabrication or improper motives and
have predicated admissibility of prior consistent statements fol-
lowing proof of impeachment on whether the statement was prior or
subsequent to the impeaching statement. Some jurisdictions do
34. 4 WIGMoRE, op. cit. supra note 21.
35. 418 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1967).
36. See text accompanying notes 43-73 infra.
37. See text accompanying note 114 infra.
38. 418 S.W.2d at 151.
19671
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss4/4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
permit introduction of prior statements when fabrication or im-
proper motives are imputed, but we see no reason to change our
rule.30
No problem is created if by this language the court is saying that
when the impeachment is by inconsistent statement rehabilitation must be
within the limits of our inconsistent statement rule. The court is quite cor-
rect in refusing to extend either the bias or recent fabrication rule into this
area. On the other hand, it would be unfortunate if this language is taken
to mean that the Missouri rule admitting consistent statements following
impeachment by inconsistent statements somehow pre-empts our use of
the bias and recent fabrication rules in proper situations. The rules are
distinct; they are applicable following different types of impeachment, and
they are based on different rationale. They are not mutually exclusive.
The bias and recent fabrication rules are applicable only when the impeach-
ment is for bias or other showing of motive, and then only when the timing
of the consistent statement was prior to the claimed bias or fabrication. The
inconsistent statement rule applies after impeachment by inconsistent state-
ments, and admission depends on a different requirement as to timing.40
Only in those rare situations where both types of impeachment have been
used on the same witness could both rules apply to admit the same con-
sistent statement from the same witness. Usually the rules apply to different
witnesses under different circumstances.
As the court pointed out, recent Missouri consistent statement cases
have concerned rehabilitation after impeachment by inconsistent statements
and have not involved the bias and recent fabrication rules. This is not
surprising since some of the rules in the inconsistent statements area have
been both unsettled and subject to criticism while the bias and recent fabri-
cation rules have been generally accepted in most jurisdictions. It would
seem a mistake to interpret this absence of dispute as a basis for rejecting
consistent statements in situations where the bias and recent fabrication
rules have always applied. As has been discussed, in these situations this re-
habilitating evidence afforded by consistent statements is logically relevant
and clearly useful.
4. Rehabilitation After Impeachment By Inconsistent Acts.
Impeachment by evidence of the witness' inconsistent or variant acts
is often classified with the inconsistent statement cases. These situations
39. Ibid. (Emphasis added).
40. See text accompanying notes 108-116 infra.
[Vol. 32
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are more correctly considered separately4 l since the reasoning supporting the
rehabilitation here differs. In these cases the witness is impeached by show-
ing his prior conduct which is claimed to be inconsistent with his testimony.
The inconsistency is merely implied from the act. However, conduct alone
is often ambiguous for this purpose. Therefore, as in the silence cases, the
statements of the witness made at or near the time of the conduct are rele-
vant to explain the acts and thus refute the inconsistency. Generally these
statements will be consistent with the witness' testimony and are clearly
admissible under this rationale.
The Missouri courts have never recognized the inherent distinction
between rehabilitation after impeachment by inconsistent acts and rehabili-
tation after impeachment by inconsistent statements because they have
never had a rehabilitation case clearly involving only acts. In addition,
since Missouri admits consistent statements in either situation such a dis-
tinction has not been necessary. This position on variant acts has been ex-
pressed several times in the following language:
Where a witness is impeached by proof of variant acts or
statements, relevant evidence of the witness' prior statements cor-
respondent with his testimony are admissible for the purpose of
rehabilitation. 42
Admission in the inconsistent act cases is based on sound and under-
standable reasoning. The inconsistent statement cases stand on different
footing, and the validity of the rationale of these cases is not so clear. When
the opportunity is presented, our court would be well-advised to recognize
the distinction.
5. Rehabilitation After Impeachment By Inconsistent Statements
There is general agreement among the courts on the use of consistent
statements following the various types of impeachment previously discussed;
however, this agreement disappears when it comes to their use following
impeachment by inconsistent statements.43 A majority of the courts reject
41. 4 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 1126 at 201 (3rd ed. 1940).
42. State v. Crocker, 275 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Mo. 1955) (Emphasis added.);
State ex rel. Berberich v. Haid, 333 Mo. 1224, 1228, 64 S.W.2d 667, 668-69 (1933);
State v. Emma, 324 Mo. 1216, 1225, 26 S.W.2d 781, 784 (1930); State v. Higgs,
.npra note 33; Steele v. Kansas City So. Ry., 302 Mo. 207, 221, 257 S.W. 756, 760
(1924); State v. Maggard, 250 Mo. 335, 347, 157 S.W. 354, 359 (1913).
43. Annot., 140 A.L.R. 21, 49 (1942); 75 A.L.R.2d 909, 930 (1961); Mc-
CoimicX, EvrDENCE § 49 at 108 (1954); 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 41, at
§ 1126; 58 AM.JuR. Witnesses § 825 (1948).
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consistent statements where the impeachment is by inconsistent statements.
Missouri and a few other jurisdictions admit them. Between these divergent
views is the so-called Michigan rule under which consistent statements are
sometimes admitted and sometimes excluded in the inconsistent statement
cases.
The courts which reject this evidence reason that the different accounts
by the witness are inconsistent no matter how many times he has repeated
the story he tells from the witness stand. The courts which admit this
evidence argue that if the inconsistent statement is to count against the
witness then a consistent statement should count for him. This dispute is
best answered by determining whether the rehabilitating evidence is relevant
to refute the impeaching evidence. This inquiry requires a careful look at
the theory of impeachment by inconsistent statements.
One unfamiliar with technical rules of evidence might assume that the
inconsistent statement is received as proof of the facts stated, thus disproving
the witness' contrary testimony. Many legal writers have argued in a con-
vincing manner that inconsistent statements should be admitted for this
purpose,44 but no court now follows this position by judicial decision. The
inconsistent statement is not admitted to prove the truth of the statement;
to do so would violate the hearsay rule.
The theory of impeachment depends only on showing the act of mak-
ing the inconsistent statement. The out-of-court statement is offered to
show that this witness is capable of making errors in his story, and from
this the jury is asked to infer that he is capable of making other errors; there-
fore, his testimony is unreliable. We place his contradictory statements side
by side, and, as both cannot be correct, we know one of them is in error,
but we do not try to determine which one. It is unnecessary to accept the
prior statement as true and the in-court statement as false because the error
is fully demonstrated by the fact of inconsistency. 45 McCormick" says the
theory of attack is based upon the idea that by talking one way on the stand
and another way on a previous occasion, the witness is blowing hot and cold.
This raises a doubt as to the truthfulness of both statements. Missouri sub-
scribes to this theory of impeachment by inconsistent statements.
47
Viewed in this light, it should be apparent that a consistent statement
44. McCoxMICK, op. dt. supra note 43, § 39; 3 WiMm oR, op. cit. supra note
41, § 1018.
45. 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 41, § 1017.
46. MCCORMIcK, op. cit. supra note 43, § 34.
47. E.g., State v. Kinne, 372 S.W.2d 62, 69 (Mo. 1963); Hammond v. Schuer-
mann Bldg. & Realty Co., 352 Mo. 418, 177 S.W.2d 618 (1944).
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fails to rehabilitate following this type of impeachment because it does not
refute the discrediting fact that the witness has spoken inconsistently. The
inconsistency remains; he continues to be in error on at least one occasion,
and he still appears as one who blows both hot and cold. The fact that on a
prior occasion, or even on a hundred prior occasions, he spoke consistently
with his testimony in court does nothing to remove the impeaching fact
that on at least one other occasion he spoke inconsistently.
In Riney v. Vanlandngham,48 the first case in which the Missouri
court considered consistent statements, they recognized the inadequacy of
this evidence by quoting from one of the authorities of that day as follows:
'It may be observed on this kind of evidence in general (consistent
statements), that a representation without oath, can scarcely be
considered as any confirmation of a statement upon oath ...
The probability is, that in almost every case the witness who swears
to certain facts at the trial, has been heard to assert the same
facts before the trial; and it is not so much in support of his char-
acter that he has given the same account, as it would be to his dis-
credit that he should ever have made one different. If a witness has
made a statement a hundred times in one way, and a hundred
times another way, directly contrary, the only inference is that he
is totally destitute of credit.' 1 Phil. Ev. 308.49
With this language in the first opinion on the subject, it comes as a
surprise to some to find that Missouri has always followed the contrary
rule. It is even more surprising to find that no Missouri opinion has ever
discussed any supporting theory for this position. Prior case precedent has
always been cited as the compelling reason for our rule. In view of this, it
is appropriate to examine the early development of the cases.
In the Riney5" case, quoted from above, the court properly held that
consistent statements unrelated to rehabilitation were not admissible. The
language of that opinion should have been sufficient to set the stage for
adoption of the majority rule when a rehabilitation case was presented.
Next, in State v. Jones,51 the court again dealt with the admission of con-
sistent statements apart from rehabilitation. In rejecting this evidence, the
opinion contained dictum that the only circumstances in which the witness'
out-of-court statements could be admitted were when brought out by the
opposing party on cross-examination or to confirm the testimony of the
48. 9 Mo. 816 (1846).
49. Id. at 822.
50. Riney v. Vanlandingham, supra note 48.
51. 61 Mo. 232, 235 (1875).
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witness after impeachment. This was obviously a general statement not in-
tended to define accurately the limits of rehabilitation.
Nevertheless, five years later in State v. Hatfield,52 when the court first
faced the issue of the use of consistent statements for rehabilitation, they
ignored the language in Riney and literally applied the dictum in Jones.
In an opinion which contained no serious discussion of the problem, they
approved the admission of consistent statements after impeachment by in-
consistent statements. Three years later in State v. Grant53 the court reached
the same result using the sweeping language that consistent statements are
admissible after any attack on the character of the witness.
This broad language was reaffirmed by dictum in a later case,54 but
in State v. Taylor,55 the court re-examined its position. In this murder
prosecution, the defendant's mother-in-law testified in his behalf and was
impeached on cross-examination with her prior contradictory statements.
In rejecting her consistent statements, which were part of her prior testi-
mony before the coroner, the Missouri court adopted the majority position
limiting rehabilitation by consistent statements to bias and recent fabrica-
tion situations. They quoted with approval several authorities supporting the
reasoning of the majority rule.5 6
This decision could have firmly established the majority rule in Mis-
souri if the holding had been correctly restated in State v. Sharp,5 the next
case on the subject. On this occasion the court agreed with the decision in
Taylor to limit the prior rule which had admitted consistent statements after
any attack on character. It failed to recognize, however, that in Taylor ad-
mission had been limited to the bias and recent fabrication cases. The court
relied on Taylor as authority for the admission of consistent statements fol-
lowing impeachment by inconsistent statements, although it held exactly
the contrary." This misstatement is the source of the minority rule in
52. 72 Mo. 518, 521 (1880).
53. 79 Mo. 113, 133-34 (1883).
54. State v. Whelehon, 102 Mo. 17, 21, 14 S.W. 730, 731 (1890).
55. 134 Mo. 109, 154-56, 35 S.W. 92, 103 (1896).
56. Id. at 155-56, 35 S.W. at 103.
57. 183 Mo. 715, 733-37, 82 S.W. 134, 140-41 (1904).
58. In the Sharp opinion, Id. at "736, 82 S.W. at 141 the court stated as fol-
lows concerning the holding in Taylor:
"In State v. Taylor, 134 Mo. 109, 35 S.W. 92, it is ruled that there is no
doubt but that, when a witness is impeached by the medium of alleged
contradictory statements, evidence may be introduced in rebuttal as to
statements made by him of a similar character theretofore made, in cor-
roboration of statements made by him on the trial."
The following quotation from the Taylor opinion, 134 Mo. at 155-56, 35 S.W. at
103 shows the actual holding of the court in that case:
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Missouri. The Sh arp case, for all practical purposes, settled the question.
It was cited and followed without serious discussion in two criminal
cases59 and was then approved in two civil cases.10 To date, Missouri
has adhered to this position without significant deviation.,' The issue has
been presented to the court with surprising regularity, but this is probably
more because of dissatisfaction with the rule than by reason of any un-
certainty as to the court's position.
There is a third position, called the Michigan rule,62 under which con-
sistent statements after impeachment by inconsistent statements are ex-
cluded on some occasions and admitted on others. This rule, first adopted
in the Michigan case of Stewart v. People,6 3 follows the reasoning of the
majority rule by recognizing that proof that the witness told the same story
"Wharton says: When a witness is assailed on the ground that he nar-
rated the facts differently on former occasions, while on re-examination it
is competent for him to give the circumstances under which the narration
was made, it is ordinarily incompetent to sustain him by proof that on
other occasions his statements were in harmony with those made on the
trial. On the other hand, where the opposing case is that the witness
testified under corrupt motives, or where the impeaching evidence goes to
charge the witness with a recent fabrication of his testimony, it is but
proper that such evidence should be rebutted. . . . Inasmuch as the
motives of Mrs. Gibson in testifying at the trial were not sought to be
impugned, her testimony taken before the coroner was, under the au-
thorities cited, inadmissible."
59. State v. Brown, 247 Mo. 715, 725-27, 153 S.W. 1027, 1030 (1913); State
v. Maggard, 250 Mo. 335, 346-49, 157 S.W. 354, 358-59 (1913).
60. Kelly v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 192 Mo. App. 20, 23-25, 178 S.W. 282,
283 (St. L. Ct. App. 1915); Flach v. Ball, 209 Mo. App. 389, 400-02, 240 S.W.
465, 467-68 (St. L. Ct. App. 1922).
61. Nielsen v. Dierking, 418 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Mo. 1967); Stafford v. Lyon,
413 S.W.2d 495, 497-98 (Mo. 1967); Huston v. Hanson, 353 S.W.2d 577, 580-82(Mo. 1962); Paige v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 323 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Mo. 1959); Mc-
Elhattan v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 309 S.W.2d 591, 594-96 (Mo. 1958); State v.
Crocker, 275 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Mo. 1955); State v. Emrich, 252 S.W.2d 310, 313-14(Mo. 1952); State v. Emrich, 250 S.W.2d 718, 724 (Mo. 1952); Piehler v. Kansas
City Pub. Serv. Co., 360 Mo. 12, 17-18, 226 S.W.2d 681, 683-84 (1950); State v.
Fleming, 354 Mo. 31, 36, 188 S.W.2d 12, 16 (1945); Hammond v. Schuermann
Bldg. & Realty Co., 352 Mo. 418, 423, 177 S.W.2d 618, 622 (1944); State v. Ran-
som, 340 Mo. 165, 173-74, 100 S.W.2d 294, 297 (1936); State ex rel. Berberich v.
Haid, 333 Mo. 1224, 1226-29, 64 S.W.2d 667, 669 (1933) reversing Quinn v. Ber-
berich, 51 S.W.2d 153, 156-57 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932); State v. Emma, 324 Mo.
1216, 1224, 26 S.W.2d 781, 784 (1930); Steele v. Kansas City So. Ry., 302 Mo.
207, 219-21, 257 S.W. 756, 759-60 (En Banc 1924); Jones v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry.,
253 S.W. 737, 740-41 (Mo. 1923); Williams v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 245 S.W.2d
659, 663-66 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952) rev'd o" other grolmds 363 Mo. 625, 253
S.W.2d 97 (En Banc 1952); Lach v. Buckner, 229 Mo. App. 1066, 1075, 86 S.W.2d
954, 960 (K.C. Ct. App. 1935); Smiley v. Bergmore Realty Co., 229 Mo. App.
141, 148, 73 S.W.2d 836, 840 (K'C. Ct. App. 1934).
62. Annot., 140 A.L.R. 21, 65 (1942); 75 A.L.R.2d 909, 934 (1961); 4 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 1126 at 198 (3rd ed. 1940).
63. 23 Mich. 63, 73-74 (1871).
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on a prior occasion does nothing to show the truthfulness of his testimony.
Therefore, the consistent statements are not admitted for this purpose. They
are, however, admitted for consideration in determining whether the witness
made the alleged inconsistent statement. This is based on the reasoning that
the making of consistent statements at or near the time of the alleged in-
consistent statement casts doubt on the claim that the witness made the im-
peaching statement. Thus, if the witness denies or otherwise refuses to admit
making the inconsistent statement, the consistent statement is admitted be-
cause under these circumstances there is dispute as to the making of the im-
peaching statement. On the other hand, if the witness admits making the
inconsistent statement, the consistent statement is excluded because under
these circumstances there is no dispute as to the making of the impeaching
statement.
There is no difference in results between the Missouri rule and the
Michigan rule when the witness refuses to admit making the impeaching
statement since under both rules, the consistent statement is admitted. How-
ever, if he admits making the impeaching statement, then the consistent
statement is excluded under the Michigan rule but is admitted under the
Missouri rule.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals thoroughly examined the Michigan rule
in Williams v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.64 where the plaintiff claimed in-
juries from a fall on a moving streetcar. The witness, another passenger,
testified the fall was caused by a sudden jerk of the car. On cross-examina-
tion she was impeached with a written report that she had mailed to the
company one week after the accident stating that there was no unusual
motion. She admitted making the statement and that it was false, but ex-
plained she thought she could avoid being a witness by giving a negative re-
port. To rehabilitate her, a police officer was then allowed to testify that
shortly after the accident she told him the streetcar gave a sudden jerk.
The court carefully reviewed the various rules on consistent statements.
They emphasized the fallacy in the reasoning of the minority position, and
they adopted the Michigan rule. Since this witness had admitted making
the conflicting report to the streetcar company, the trial court was reversed
for admitting the police officer's testimony.
Interestingly, although the opinion contains an extensive review of the
Missouri cases on the use of consistent statements, the court failed to dis-
cuss or even cite the one prior Missouri case that supported the Michigan
64. 245 S.W.2d 659, 663-66 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952).
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rule. 65 In State v. Creed60 the witness, on cross-examination, admitted she
gave contrary perjured testimony before the coroner and grand jury. In
rejecting a consistent written statement offered to rehabilitate, the court
stated:
The defendant had discredited the witness by cross-examination
and by her admission of perjury. The purpose of the state was to
rehabilitate it. There were two inconsistent statements, one of
which was necessarily false. Defendant did not offer the cross-
examination to prove the verity of her testimony, but to show that
it was unworthy of belief and could not be relied upon. Her testi-
mony was discredited, and she was a perjurer by her own admis-
sion. Her impeachment was not disproved by the use of the sup-
plementary statement, and that was all it offered to establish ....
The only way to meet evidence of a contradictory statement is
to prove the witness did not make it. In the present case she ad-
mitted making it.67
On appeal, Williams was reversed on a procedural point. 8 The supreme
court recognized and delineated the issue presented, but they refused to
either approve or reject the Michigan rule. This left the Missouri position
unsettled.
The court continued to follow the minority position without reference
to Williams until McElhattan v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.69 when they
again refused to either approve or reject the Williams position since
that rule would not exclude consistent statementes in this situation be-
cause the witness testified he did not remember making the inconsistent
statement.
A clear decision on the Michigan rule required facts where the witness
clearly admitted making the inconsistent statement. In Huston v. Hanson70
the defendant appealed relying on the Williams rule for reversal, but the
court found that the essence of the witness' testimony was that he did not
remember making the inconsistent statement so the requisite facts for a
decision settling the issue were again missing. In approving the admission
of the consistent statement the court distinguished Williams because there
"the witness had impeached herself by her own admission of intentionally
65. It was cited in appellant's brief on appeal to the Supreme Court. 363 Mo.
625, 627 (En Banc 1952).
66. 299 Mo. 307, 252 S.W. 678 (1923).
67. Id. at 316, 252 S.W. at 680.
68. 363 Mo. 625, 634-36, 253 S.W.2d 97, 103-04 (En Banc 1952).
69. 309 S.W.2d 591, 594-96 (Mo. 1958).
70. 353 S.W.2d 577, 580-82 (Mo. 1962).
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making a false statement. . . ,"7 By this decision the rule in Williams re-
mained neither approved nor rejected, but this language afforded an open-
ing for severely limiting its application.
The court took advantage of that opening in Stafford v. Lyon 7 2
the recent case discussed at the beginning of this article. The Michigan rule
was squarely in issue since the witness clearly admitted making the written
statement used for impeachment. The court concluded that by this state-
ment in Huston, the Williams rule, under which consistent statements are
excluded, was narrowly restricted to those situations in which the witness
admits making the inconsistent statement deliberately and falsely for his
own purposes. The exact limits of this distinction are not altogether clear.
The Stafford opinion does not disclose the circumstances of the impeach-
ing statement except to say the witness admitted making it. On this basis
the case was distinguished from Williams. Apparently an inconsistent state-
ment admittedly made in error would not be deliberate and false so would
be treated the same way. Beyond this, it remains to be seen what situations,
if any, will be brought within the Williams rule. Although the court has
indicated approval of Williams,7 3 no case has actually rejected consistent
statements on that principle since it has always been distinguished. In the
form to which Williams is now limited, any rationale for treating that situa-
tion one way and all other inconsistent statement cases another is most
obscure.
In summary, Missouri continues to follow the minority position admit-
ting consistent statements following impeachment by inconsistent state-
ments. Although we have not expressly rejected the Michigan rule, we have
so limited it as to destroy any improved reasoning it might bring to our
decisions. At the same time, the failure to overrule Williams leaves a small
undefined area in which consistent statements may be rejected; in this re-
spect our position is a hybred unknown to any other jurisdiction.
C. Other Rides Admitting Consistent Statements
Two other rules, unrelated to those already discussed, are sometimes
confused with the rehabilitation cases because they apply in impeachment
situations and often operate to admit consistent statements. First, where im-
peachment is based on an alleged inconsistent statement, evidence will al-
ways be admitted to dispute the impeaching evidence as to what the state-
71. Id. at 582.
72. 413 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Mo. 1967).
73. Id. at 498.
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ment actually was. Thus in State v. Simmons 4 where the witness had
identified the defendant as the man who robbed him, he was impeached
by other witnesses who testified that at the police station he stated that
the man who robbed him was bigger than the defendant. The state was
then allowed to call police officers present at the time who testified that the
witness did not make that statement, but in fact said that the defendant was
the person who robbed him. This was consistent with his testimony, but it
was admitted to directly refute the defendant's evidence that a contradictory
statement was uttered.
The other such rule also applies where the impeachment is by incon-
sistent statement. It allows the impeached party to put other portions of
the same statement in evidence to show the context and circumstances of
the entire statement. Thus, where the opposing party proves an inconsistent
statement that is part of a written statement,75 a deposition, 7 6 or testimony
at a former trial,77 the other party may read from the same statement,
deposition, or testimony other portions which are relevant to show the
context or circumstances of the inconsistent portion. To the extent that
these parts confirm direct testimony of the witness, consistent statements
are admitted.
There are also some particular types of cases in which special rules
operate to admit consistent statements for reasons quite unlike those in the
rehabilitation cases. The discussion of these rules is beyond the scope of
this article, but they are mentioned to avoid confusion with the rehabilita-
tion theories. One of these is the rule that admits evidence of the prior identi-
fication of the defendant in criminal cases.1 8 Another is that which admits
evidence in a rape case of the complaint of the prosecutrix usually made at
or near the time of the violation.7 9 On similar theories a few courts admit
evidence of complaint by the victim of certain other crimes.80 Although the
effect of these rules is to admit certain consistent statements of the witness,
it is important to recognize that the rationale for admission is entirely dif-
ferent from the rehabilitation cases.
74. State v. Simmons, 39 S.W.2d 774, 775-80 (Mo. 1931); accord., State v.
Powell, 55 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Spr. Mo. App. 1932).
75. State v. Beishir, 332 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Mo. 1960).
76. State v. Robertson, 328 S.W.2d 576, 582 (Mo. 1959).
77. State v. Gerberding, 272 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Mo. 1954).
78. Hardy, Admissibility of Prior Identification Testimony, 31 Mo. L. REV.
558 (1966).
79. State v. Richardson, 349 Mo. 1103, 1111, 163 S.W.2d 956, 960 (1942);
WIGMORE, o p. cit. supra note 62, §§ 1134-40.
80. WiGMORE, op. cit. supra note 62, §§ 1142-43.
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II. FURTHER ASPECTS OF THE MISSOURI RULE
A. The Requirement of Impeachment
In Missouri the only types of impeachment which will permit the use
of consistent statements for rehabilitation are bias, recent fabrication, and
inconsistent statements.81 Direct contradiction of the witness by another
witness will not permit the use of consistent statements82 nor will mere
cross-examination, no matter how vigorous.8 3 The court has rejected con-
sistent statements after the witness was asked on cross-examination if he
had discussed his testimony with his attorneys.8 4 They were also rejected
where the impeaching evidence revealed that the plaintiff had failed to
disclose prior injuries in an earlier personal injury action against another
defendant.88
In the inconsistent statement cases, the court has been strict in re-
quiring actual proof of the impeaching statement before the consistent state-
ment will be admitted. Before using an inconsistent statement for impeach-
ment, a foundation must be laid.8 6 This is done by asking the witness on
cross-examination if he made the inconsistent statement. The question must
be sufficiently specific as to time, place, and person to whom made so as
to identify the statement for the witness. 87 If the witness admits he made
it, this proves the statement, and extrinsic evidence is not necessary. Only
if the witness does not admit making the statement is extrinsic evidence
admissible to prove it.88 One reason for requiring the foundation question
is to avoid surprising the witness by giving him an opportunity to disprove
or explain the statement. Also it avoids the time consuming process of prov-
81. The early case of State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113, 133-34 (1883), which
stated consistent statements were admissible after any attack on character was
limited to impeachment by consistent statements in State v. Sharp, 183 Mo. 715,
736, 82 S.W. 134, 141 (1904). See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
82. Aly v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. L., 336 Mo. 340, 351, 78 S.W.2d 851,
856 (1934).
83. State v. Fleming, 354 Mo. 31, 36-38, 188 S.W.2d 12, 16 (1945); accord,
McElhattan v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 309 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Mo. 1958).
84. State v. Brown, 247 Mo. 715, 725-27, 153 S.W. 1027, 1030 (1913).
85. Ayres v. Keith, 355 S.W.2d 914, 921-22 (Mo. 1962).
86. State v. Stallings, 326 Mo. 1037, 1046-47, 33 S.W.2d 914, 917 (1930);
Peppers v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 316 Mo. 1104, 1117-18, 295 S.W. 757, 762 (1927);
Kersten v. Hines, 283 Mo. 623, 632-33, 223 S.W. 586, 589 (En Banc 1920).
87. State v. Stallings, supra note 86; Peppers v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., sitpra
note 86; State v. Parker, 96 Mo. 382, 393, 9 S.W. 728, 733 (1888).
88. State v. Wallach, 389 S.W.2d 7, 12-13 (Mo. 1965); Andrews v. Parker,
259 S.W. 807, 810-11 (St. L. Mo. App. 1924); State v. Cooper, 83 Mo. 698 (1884).
Bt see WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 62, § 1037 stating that the better and more
widely accepted rule is that extrinsic evidence should be admitted no matter what
the answer to the foundation question.
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ing it by extrinsic evidence if the witness is willing to admit he made it.89
Several Missouri cases have considered the admissibility of rehabilitating
evidence where the witness did not admit making the statement when the
foundation question was asked and no extrinsic evidence was ever offered
to prove it. In McElhattan v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. 90 the witness testi-
fied concerning stop and go lights in an intersection case. He was asked on
cross-examination if he remembered giving an investigating attorney a writ-
ten statement that said there were no electric signals at the intersection. He
answered that he did not remember that statement. In Paige v. Missouri
Pac. R.R. 91 a certain question and answer from the witness' deposition was
read to him, and he was asked if he gave that answer to that question.
He replied that he did not recall that answer. In each case the impeachment
process stopped with the foundation question because neither the written
statement nor the deposition was offered in evidence by the cross-examining
party. In each case, the other party then offered the consistent statement of
the witness for rehabilitation.
In accord with its prior decisions on this question,9 2 the court held in
both cases that the subsequent offer of consistent statements was pre-
mature and should not be admitted in evidence because the witness had not
actually been impeached by inconsistent statements. Only the foundation
question had been asked so there was no actual proof of the inconsistent
statement.
These decisions are sound in refusing rehabilitation since the court
should .not spend time rehabilitating a witness where impeachment is not
actually proved. On the other hand, although rehabilitation is denied since
there is no actual impeachment, the party calling the witness may feel that
doubt has been cast upon the testimony by the suggestive nature of the
foundation question, which the jury may fail to distinguish from the actual
proof of the inconsistent statement. The party calling the witness should
move to strike the foundation questions and answers from the consideration
of the jury when it becomes apparent the inconsistent statement will not
be offered. The foundation has no place in the record when proof of the
statement is withheld. With appropriate instruction to the jury, this should
89. WIGMoaE, op. cit. supra note 62, § 1125.
90. 309 S.W.2d 591, 594-96 (Mo. 1958).
91. 323 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Mo. 1959).
92. Long v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 232 Mo. App. 417, 427-28, 109 S.W.2d 85,
91-92 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937); Flach v. Ball, 209 Mo. App. 389, 400, 240 S.W. 465,
467 (St. L. Ct. App. 1922) (alternative holding); See State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113,
133-34 (1883). But see Smiley v. Bergmore Realty Co., 229 Mo. App. 141, 148-49,
73 S.W.2d 836, 840-41 (K.C. Ct. App. 1934).
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minimize any benefit to be gained from the implied but unproved incon-
sistency. Where possible, the trial judge might refuse to allow the foundation
questions to be asked unless the cross-examining party is pursuing good
faith cross-examination, which should require an intention to prove the
statement where proof is reasonably available.
B. Proving the Consistent Statement
Like inconsistent statements, consistent statements take many forms.
They may be testimonial in nature such as testimony in former trials9 3
or in other hearings such as before a grand jury,9 4 a coroner,9 5 or in pre-
liminary criminal hearings; 6 or they may be found in depositions in either
the present9 7 or other cases. 8 They may be in writings such as a written
statement taken by an investigator 9 or a questionnaire returned by mail to
one of the parties 0 0 or parts of a letter or other document written by the
witness.10 ' Most commonly they are merely oral statements made by the
witness in the presence of some other person.' 02
93. State v. Crocker, 275 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Mo. 1955)(attorney for accom-
plice tried separately testified to the testimony of the witness in the other trial);
State v. Gerberding, 272 S.W.2d 230, 334 (Mo. 1954) (court reporter testified to
witness' prior testimony).
94. See State v. Whelehon, 102 Mo. 17, 21, 14 S.W. 730, 731 (1890) (dictum);
cf. State v. Creed, 299 Mo. 307, 314-17, 252 S.W. 678, 680 (1923).
95. State v. Taylor, 134 Mo. 109, 35 S.W. 92, 103 (1896); State v. Creed,
stipra note 94.
96. See Flach v. Ball, supra note 92.
97, State ex rel. Berberich v. Haid, 333 Mo. 1224, 1226-29, 64 S.W.2d 667-69
(1933) reversing 51 S.W.2d 153, 156-57 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932); Quinn v.
Berberich, 68 S.W.2d 925, 926-27 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934) (retrial of previously cited
case); see Ayres v. Keith, 355 S.W.2d 914, 921-22 (Mo. 1962); State v. Robertson,
328 S.W.2d 576, 582 (Mo. 1959); Paige v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 323 S.W.2d 753,
757 (Mo. 1959).
98. Steele v. Kansas City So. Ry., 302 Mo. 207, 219-22, 257 S.W. 756, 759-60
(1924).
99. Stafford v. Lyon, 413 S.W.2d 495, 497-98 (Mo. 1965); Huston v. Hanson,
353 S.W.2d 577, 580-82 (Mo. 1962); McElhattan v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 309
S.W.2d 591, 594-96 (Mo. 1958).
100. Piehler v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 360 Mo. 12, 17-18, 226 S.W.2d 681,
683-84 (1950).
101. Cf., State v. Johnson, 334 Mo. 10, 19-20, 64 S.W.2d 655, 659 (1933).
102. E.g., State v. Emrich, 252 S.W.2d 310, 313-14 (Mo. 1952) (highway
patrolman, sheriff and newspaperman testified to statements the witness made after
being arrested with the defendant); State v. Emrich, 250 S.W.2d 718, 724 (Mo.
1952) (law officers testified to statements the witness made about the crime);
State v. Richardson, 349 Mo. 1103, 1110-11, 163 S.W.2d 956, 960 (1942) (mother
testified to complaints daughter made of being raped by her father, the defendant);
State v. Ransom, 340 Mo. 165, 173-74, 100 S.W.2d 294, 297 (1936) (owner of serv-
ice station testified to conversation with his employee after robbery); State v.




Thomas: Thomas: Rehanilitating the Impeached
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
REHABILITATING WITNESSES
Unlike inconsistent statements, the courts do not require foundation
questions in showing consistent statements. The reasons for requiring a
foundation for inconsistent statements are not applicable in the case of con-
sistent statements.10 3 When admissible, they may be proved by the im-
peached witness himself104 or by extrinsic evidence 0 5 or by both.106
C. Restrictons on the Missouri Rule
The Missouri courts apply two important restrictions on the use of
consistent statements after impeachment by inconsistent statements. The
first is that only those consistent statements that are related to the subject
matter of the impeaching statement are admissible? ° No matter what rea-
soning is relied upon to support the minority rule of admission in the incon-
sistent statement cases, it is clear that consistent statements on subject
matter foreign to that of the inconsistent statement could never be relevant
to rehabilitate.
The second restriction in the inconsistent statement cases is the re-
quirement that the consistent statement must have been made prior to the
time of the inconsistent statement. The supreme court first adopted this
rule in State v. Creed'0 8 where the defendants were charged with killing a
police officer in a saloon. The witness, described in the opinion as a lewd
woman, gave police a written statement incriminating the defendants. The
next day in testimony before the grand jury and the coroner she changed
her story to absolve them. A few hours later she gave the police a supple-
mental written statement retracting her testimony and again implicating the
defendants. At trial she testified against the defendants, and on cross-exami-
nation she was impeached with her inconsistent testimony before the grand
jury and coroner. The trial court was reversed for allowing the use of the
supplemental statement for rehabilitation because it was made subsequent
to the impeaching statements. The court reasoned that this limitation is
necessary because:
Admitting such testimony would resolve itself in a race resulting
in rebuttal and surrebuttal, to determine which party could pro-
103. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
104. State v. Sharp, 183 Mo. 715, 733-37, 82 S.W. 134, 141 (1904).
105. E.g., cases cited note 102 supra; State v. Crocker, .'ndra note 93 (con-
sistent statement shown on cross-examination of the impeaching witness).
106. State v. Emma, 324 Mo. 1216, 1224-25, 26 S.W.2d 781, 784 (1930).
107. State v. Fleming, 354 Mo. 31, 37-38, 188 S.W.2d 12, 16 (1945).
108. 299 Mo. 307, 317, 252 S.W. 678, 681 (1923) (alternative holding).
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duce the greater number of witnesses in contradiction. This would
not determine their credibility and would lead to injustice.10 9
The St. Louis Court of Appeals had reached the same conclusion on the
same question a year earlier. 110 On every occasion since when this issue has
been discussed, the court has required that the consistent statement be prior
in time to the impeaching statement"' although in two cases where the
issue was not discussed and apparently was not raised by counsel, the court
approved the admission of consistent statements made after the inconsistent
statement.."
2
The burden of proving the sequence of time between the two state-
ments is on the offering party. Thus, a trial court was affirmed in reject-
ing an offer of proof which contained all the requisites for admitting a con-
sistent statement except a specific reference to the sequence of time between
the two statements."13
Finally, the very recent case of Nielsen v. Dierking"4 is particularly
helpful because it spells out in some detail the mechanics for determining
which statement was prior. In this case there was conflicting evidence as to
which statement was prior. The impeaching statement, taken by an attorney
and a reporter on a stenotype machine, was dated January 7, 1963. The re-
habilitating statement, taken in longhand by an attorney, was dated July 2,
1963, almost six months later. The witness, called by the defendant, testi-
fied the statements were given on the respective dates shown therein. Later,
on the second round of redirect and recross-examination, she vacillated and
109. Ibid.
110. Flach v. Ball, 209 Mo. App. 389, 400-02, 240 S.W. 465, 467-68 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1922) (alternative holding).
111. State ex rel. Berberich v. Haid, 333 Mo. 1224, 1226-29, 64 S.W.2d 667-69(1933) (inconsistent statement was part of written statement given shortly after
the accident and consistent statement was part of deposition taken on Saturday
before trial started) reversing Quinn v. Berberich, 51 S:W.2d 153, 156-57 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1932) (recognizing the rule requiring the consistent statement to be
prior in time but which held the admission of a later statement was not prejudicial);
Jones v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 253 S.W. 737, 740-41 (Mo. 1923) (inconsistent state-
ment made to persons at the accident and consistent statement made to a doctor
at the hospital); Ayres v. Keith, 355 S.W.2d 914, 921-22 (Mo. 1962) (alternative
holding) (inconsistent statement in prior litigation and consistent statement in
deposition in present case). But see Smiley v. Bergmore Realty Co., 229 Mo. App.
141, 147-48, 73 S.W.2d 836, 840 (K.C. Ct. App. 1934).
112. State v. Crocker, 275 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Mo. 1955) (inconsistent statement
at preliminary hearing of an accomplice and consistent statement at the trial of
the accomplice); State v. Higgs, 259 S.W. 454, 457 (Mo. 1924) (consistent state-
ment to driver who took injured witness to the hospital and consistent statement
to doctor at the hospital).
113. State v. Ashbrook, 11 S.W.2d 1037, 1039 (Mo. 1928).
114. 418 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1967).
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stated that the longhand statement used to rehabilitate was given two or
three days or perhaps a week prior to the impeaching statement. The trial
court allowed the defendant to rehabilitate the witness with the consistent
statement. In so ruling, it is possible that the court decided the consistent
statement was prior to the inconsistent statement, but it appears more likely
that the prior in time requirement was simply misapplied."15
After the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, the trial court
granted the plaintiff a new trial for error in admitting the consistent state-
ment. In affirming the granting of the new trial, the supreme court first
reaffirmed the requirement that the consistent statement must be prior to
the inconsistent statement. They pointed out that determination of the
factual question of which statement was executed first is a question of law
to be determined by the trial judge. The defendant contended that, since
there was some evidence that the consistent statement was prior, it was
admissible as a matter of law. In rejecting this the court stated:
It [the consistent statement] is admissible if, and only if, the court
finds as a fact that it was made prior to the impeaching state-
ment."1 6
They further stated that even though the court determines at trial
that the statement is admissible, it can later conclude on a motion for new
trial that the facts justify and compel a different conclusion. However, the
trial court's determination of which statement is prior will not be disturbed
on appeal unless there has been an abuse of judgment or discretion amount-
ing to error of law.
D. Not Substantive Proof
The principle that consistent statements are not admitted as sub-
stantive proof of the facts stated was discussed when first considering the
basis for their relevancy as rehabilitating evidence." 7 They are admitted
only as proof of the fact that a statement was made. The opposing party
is entitled to an instruction to the jury to this effect. 15
115. Id. at 150.
116. Id. at 150-51.
117. Cases cited note 12, supra.
118. State v. Emma, 324 Mo. 1216, 1225, 26 S.W.2d 781, 785 (1930) approved
a written instruction which advised the jury that the consistent statements were
not admitted "as proof of the facts contained in the statement, but solely for the
purpose of corroborating the testimony of the witness . . . ." Under MissouRI Ar-
PPOVED JuRY INSTRUcrIONs, effective January 1, 1965, no formal instruction would
be given to the jury but the trial judge at the time the evidence is received would
inform the jury of the limited purpose of the evidence as stated above.
1967]
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This is the same rule as is applied to the admission of inconsistent
statements for impeachment. They are admitted to prove the act of incon-
sistency, but not to prove the truth of the statement.119 Although the the-
ory of the rule is the same for both kinds of statements, the effect in appli-
cation is different.
In the case of inconsistent statements, the operation of the rule is best
observed in a situation where the inconsistent statement is the only evi-
dence of a necessary element of the plaintiff's case. For example, in State v.
Fitc0'20 the prosecution's key witness failed to identify the defendant at
trial. The witness was impeached by showing that at the police station he
identified the defendant as the person in question. Since this inconsistent
statement at the police station was the only testimony identifying the de-
fendant, the court held that the state had failed to prove this element of
its case. The court stated, ". . . the impeachment. . . left the case just
where it was before the impeachment-without any evidence to show that
defendant was the [person in question] ."121 In these cases, since the testi-
mony of the witness differs from the inconsistent statement, it is plausible
to instruct the jury to disregard the out-of-court statement as proof of the
facts stated, but to consider the act of making it as bearing on the truth
of the contrary testimony in court. Although this requires some fancy
mental gymnastics, the idea can at least be broadly conveyed to the jury.
The application of this rule to the consistent statement is quite dif-
ferent because the in-court testimony is the same in substance as the out-
of-court statement. Here we are telling the jury that they cannot consider
the consistent statement as proof of the facts stated, but they should con-
sider it as corroborative of another statement containing the same facts.
In dealing with a similar problem, Justice Cardozo once observed: "Dis-
crimination so subtle is a feat beyond the compass of ordinary minds." 22
The practical result is that in response to the instruction the jury may
sometimes reduce the weight given to the consistent statement, but it is
unlikely that they really understand, much less apply, the rule limiting
the statement to non-substantive purposes.
E. Consistent Statement by a Party
So far the discussion has concerned only the consistent statements of
119. Text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
120. 162 S.W.2d 327 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
'121, Id. at 330.
122. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
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the impeached witness. What if the witness is also a party? There is a
major difference between the use of the out-of-court inconsistent statement
of the witness for impeachment and the use of the out-of-court statement
of the opposing party. While the hearsay rule bars the use of the witness'
inconsistent statement to prove the facts stated, a like statement of an
opposing party is admissible as proof of the facts stated because it is an
admission under the hearsay rule.1 23 Where the party has testified and his
contradictory out-of-court statement is shown on cross-examination or by
another witness, this statement serves two purposes: first, it is proof of the
facts stated; second, it impeaches the party in his role as a witness. 12 4
Therefore, the party, as an impeached witness, should be able to use his
prior consistent statements for purposes of rehabilitation just as any other
witness.
It is clear from the Missouri cases that if the consistent statement of
the party is offered to prove the facts stated, it will not be admitted. 25
Two recent Missouri cases leave the question of admissibility uncertain
when the party's statement is offered for non-substantive purposes. In
Stratton v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 26 the plaintiff offered her
prior written statement that she fell on broken sidewalk and not on ice as
contended by the defendant. The opinion says that the statement must be
excluded because it was offered to prove the facts stated. 27 There is lan-
guage in the opinion, however, which suggests that the consistent statement
of a party is not admissible even when offered for the limited purpose of
rehabilitating the party as a witness. 28 In Kratzer v. King1 2 the court
rejected consistent portions of the impeached plaintiff's deposition stating
simply that it was "clearly self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible," but
without citation of authorities or discussion of the rehabilitation concept.
On the other hand, in a much earlier case'30 a majority of the court
approved the admission of the prior consistent statement of a party-witness
123. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (3rd ed. 1940).
124. Ibid.
125. Stratton v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 337 S.W.2d 927, 930-32 (Mo. 1960);
Gough v. General Box Co., 302 S.W.2d 884, 887-88 (Mo. 1957).
126. Supra note 125.
127. Id. at 932.
128. Id. at 931 where the court stated "... it certainly was error to admit
this self-serving statement of plaintiff for any purpose . . . ." Also see the general
discussion in the opinion of the various differences between out-of-court statements
of parties and witnesses.
129. 401 S.W.2d 405, 409 (Mo. 1966).
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where it was offered for rehabilitation. The trial court was reversed on two
grounds: this evidentiary matter and an unrelated instruction issue. Four
judges who concurred in the result on the instruction issue, however, re-
fused to rule on the applicability of the consistent statement theory of re-
habilitation to a party.131 On several other occasions the court has dealt with
consistent statement cases involving parties; sometimes admitting them,132
and sometimes rejecting them, 33 but always on other grounds and without
indication that the rehabilitation theory is inapplicable where the witness
is a party.
Wigmore 34 says that the same rule should be applied to parties as is
applied to witnesses so that in a jurisdiction like Missouri, where the con-
sistent statements of a witness are admitted after impeachment by in-
consistent statements, the court should also admit the consistent statements
of a party if he has testified and his inconsistent admissions have been
shown. Such a rule merely recognizes the dual purpose of the out-of-court
statement of a party by allowing the impeaching function to be met with
the same type of rehabilitating evidence as is available to any other
witness. Since our courts have been willing for the witness to be supported
by his out-of-court consistent statements, it is only reasonable that they
should be willing to afford the same opportunity to the party, who is often
the most important witness in the litigation.
*, 'F. An Evaluation of the Missouri Rule
It should be clear from previous discussions that the minority rule
followed in Missouri is subject to substantial criticism because of the absence
of any sound theory to support it. Notwithstanding this fact, a fair
appraisal of our rule suggests that the results which obtain from it are not
as objectionable as might seem, and in some ways may be preferable to
that followed in some other jurisdictions.
131. Id. at 222, 257 S.W. at 760.
132. Wills v. Sullivan, 211 Mo. App. 318, 329-31, 242 S.W. 180, 183-84 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1922). This case, discussed in text accompanying note 27 supra, applies
both the bias rule and the recent fabrication rule.
133. Ayres v. Keith, 355 S.W.2d 914, 921-22 (Mo. 1962) (plaintiff's consistent
statements in deposition rejected because impeachment was not by inconsistent
statements and the deposition was not prior in time to the impeaching event);
Paige v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 323 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Mo. 1959) (plaintiff's consistent
statements in deposition rejected because although foundation had been laid for
inconsistent statements, they had not been proved); Gough v. General Box Co.,
spra note 125 (plaintiff's consistent statement offered as substantive proof of the
acts stated); Jones v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 253 S.W. 737, 740-41 (Mo. 1923) (plain-
tiff's consistent statement rejected because it was not prior in time to the im-
peaching statement).
134. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1133 (3rd ed. 1940).
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First, consider our rule in comparison with the Michigan rule 36 under
which the consistent statement is admitted to help the jury determine
whether the witness actually uttered the impeaching statement. Under
this rule, the consistent statement is admitted in all those cases where, in
response to the foundation question, the witness refuses to admit he made
the inconsistent statement. Since the Missouri rule is one of admission in
any situation where the impeachment is by inconsistent statement, the
two rules give the same results except in those few instances where the
witness clearly admits he made the impeaching statement. Even if a pref-
erence for the reasoning of the Michigan rule is conceded, the result differs
in such a small percentage of the cases that the practical difference between
following one rule or the other is minor.
There are some considerations which suggest that the Missouri result
is preferable. For one thing, it seems questionable whether the relatively
unimportant fact of admitting or denying the inconsistent statement should
govern the entire course of rehabilitation In this same respect, if the use
of consistent statements is to depend solely on the witness' refusal to
admit making the impeaching statement, this fact will encourage the wit-
ness to avoid such an admission by responding to the foundation question
with assertions of faulty memory, if not outright false denials. In these
respects the Missouri rule may be better even though the logic of the
Michigan rule is superior.
In addition, the results under the Missouri rule probably comes closer
to the more progressive thinking on the admission in general of out-of-court
statements than any of the other rules. For several years, leading writers
in the field of evidence have urged that where the witness is present in
court, his prior out-of-court statements should be admitted as substantive
evidence of the facts stated.136 More recently, the Uniform Rides of Evi-
dence,137 now adopted or under consideration in various states, 3 provide
for the admission of all previous statements of any person present at the
hearing and available for cross-examination 3 9 subject only to the discretion
of the judge to exclude when probative value is outweighed by considera-
135. Text accompanying notes 62-73.
136. McCoRMICK, EVMENCE, § 39 (1954); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (3rd
ed. 1940).
137. Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and by it approved at its Annual Conference, 1953. Approved by the Ameri-
can Bar Association, 1953.
138. E.g. Adopted in Kansas, 1963, also in Panama Canal Zone and the Virgin
Islands; inconsistent statements admitted for substantive purposes under CAL.
EVIDENCE CODE 1235, effective January 1, 1967.
139. UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENcE 63(1).
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tions of time, prejudice, confusion, or surprise.140 The trend seems to be
toward the admission of all out-of-court statements to prove the facts
stated if the witness is present in court. An extensive discussion of all the
arguments and reasons for this position is beyond the scope of this article.
Among the more important is that the witness is present for cross-examina-
tion, which eliminates the principal dangers of hearsay evidence. Also, since
the prior statements are nearer in time sequence to the event related, they
may often be more accurate than the testimony.141
Since the Missouri rule admits both consistent and inconsistent state-
ments while the majority rule would admit only the latter, the result in the
Missouri cases more nearly approaches that of the Uniform Rides. Under
our rule the jury is instructed not to consider the statement as substantive
proof while the Uniform Rides would not apply this limitation, but the
distinction is less significant in practice than in theory when the effect
which the average juror gives to such an instruction is honestly appraised.
III. CONCLUSION
While it is possible to point to favorable aspects in the Missouri
position, the strongest indication that our rule is inferior is that it must be
defended on case precedent without consideration for supporting theory or
on the assumption that the jury uses the evidence for a different purpose
than that for which it is admitted. Admission of consistent statements in
the bias and recent fabrication cases is based on sound rationale, and the
function of the evidence can be properly understood by the jury. This can-
not be said for admission where the impeachment is by inconsistent state-
ments. If our rule is to be justified because it is desirable for the jury to
have the use of the out-of-court statement for substantive purposes, then
this should be accomplished either by legislation or by judicial decision
embodying that principle and not upon the fiction of misused rehabilitation.
On the other hand, if the substantive use of consistent statements is
unwise, then we should be prepared to re-examine our position on rehibili-
tation in the inconsistent statement cases. The act of making a consistent
statement fails to refute the fact that the witness spoke inconsistently, and,
failing to meet this issue, it is useless for rehabilitation purposes. Respect
for case precedent is an important characteristic of our system of law,
but it was never intended to prevent the courts from the needed re-exami-
140. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 45.
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nation of any principle,-no matter how long standing it may be. When the
opportunity is afforded, our court should look beyond the holdings of prior
decisions and carefully consider whether consistent statements can properly
be said to rehabilitate the inconsistent witness.
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